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Although the capability and proliferation of organised crime groups (OCG’s), can overwhelm 
the finite resources of policing agencies, responses often rely on enforcement led 
approaches that are resource intensive and limited in effectiveness. More recently 
disruptive and preventative approaches (associated with volume crime), have been 
promoted, although the detail often remains ambiguous. This paper provides a case study of 
an innovative disruption approach, implemented by a police force situated in the North of 
England, against an OCG.  
 
Design 
The multi-agency disruption tactics, identified in the project, were categorised using the five 
themes highlighted by Cornish & Clarke (1986) in their paper on Rational Choice Theory. The 
impact generated by the interventions was evaluated by comparing criminal conviction data 
and police intelligence prior to the police operation commencing with similar data two years 
after this date. This data was supported by semi-structured interviews with seven police 
officers (including patrol, detective, middle and senior ranking officers), three members of 
external public sector organisations and five members of the local community where the 
OCG resided.  
 
Findings 
The study shows the approach was effective in both reducing the threat of the OCG as well 
as generating support from police practitioners, partner agencies and community members.  
 
Practical implications 
The evaluation showed the disruption operation was successful in both limiting the 
capability and capacity of the OCG. As it was delivered with no increased resources it 
provides a viable and cost effective method of reducing the threat caused by organised 
crime and increasing confidence in the police. It is argued, in theory, this approach can be 
transferred to any police agency across the world. 
 
Originality 
Case studies in relation to the prevention and disruption of organized crime are rare 
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Castels (1996, 1998) argues organised criminal groups (OCGs) have seized the 
commercial, political and social opportunities caused by late modernity. An 
increasingly mobile and interconnected world (both physical and virtual), has 
created criminogenic possibilities from which illegal entrepreneurialism can prosper. 
Indeed organized crime is viewed as an insidious global phenomenon, a powerful 
economic force engaged with the illicit transnational movement of people, 
commodities, and services (Kirby & Penna, 2011). Although the detail of what 
constitutes organized crime is often disputed by academics (Finckenaeur, 2005), and 
the sums involved ambiguous, the problem is significant enough to threaten the 
stability of many international governments. The United Nations estimated US$125b 
a year is generated through illicit transnational crime flows (UNODC), and Europol, in 
their 2011 threat assessment, highlight the constantly evolving nature and growth of 
this phenomenon. This evolution therefore presents a significant challenge to law 
enforcement agencies. However this is not just at an international level but 
throughout each tier of criminality, from transnational to national to regional to 
local. In the UK it is estimated there are approximately 38,000 offenders operating 
within 6,000 organised crime groups (Home Office 2011), and in 2005, it was 
estimated that ‘less than 6 per cent were being targeted’ (HMIC 2006: 5). This 
challenge is increasing as law enforcement agencies face budget reductions as a 
result of the worldwide recession (Gilmour, 2008). This study examines the 
operational effectiveness of using a disruptive and preventative methodology to 
tackle OCGs in a more cost effective manner. Specifically it follows officers from a 
Police Force in the North of England, for a three year period,  as they identify and 
confront an OCG based within their jurisdiction.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first stage of any response to organized crime is its identification. This is in itself 
problematic as a unified definition of organized crime remains elusive with von 
Lampe (2011) currently accumulating 185 definitions from academics and 
practitioners across the globe. The identification of organized crime is clearly a 
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complex and multifaceted phenomena and although Albanese (2007; 2008) argues 
analysis should focus on illicit markets and products, that relate to the provision of 
illicit services and goods and infiltration of legitimate business, the overwhelming 
focus remains on the criminal actors. In this way definitions generally focus on such 
issues as: collaboration of more than two people; serious offences; in pursuit of 
profit and/or power; using violence or intimidation; and operating across borders 
(van der Heijden, cited in Gilmour, 1996). This study also concentrates on the 
offenders using  the common UK operational definition, outlined in the Serious 
Organized Crime Agency Threat Assessment (2006:2), which highlights…. “Those 
involved on a continuing basis, normally working with others, in committing crimes 
for substantial profit or gain, for which a person aged 21 or over on first conviction 
could expect to be imprisoned for three years or more”. 
 
Although law enforcement agencies have become more proactive in their approach, 
using an ‘intelligence-led approach in relation to serious and organized crime 
(Ratcliffe, 2008), they continue to focus upon enforcement, which involves the arrest 
and prosecution of the most prolific offenders. This approach is time consuming and 
expensive, and its efficacy as well as its usefulness as a measure can be challenged 
(Albanese, 2008). Nicholas, et al. (2007), graphically illustrate the inefficiency of an 
enforcement-based approach using general crime data from the British Crime Survey 
(BCS) and UK police crime records. Using a hypothetical sample of 1,000 crimes they 
argue only 410 (41%) would be reported to the police; 287 (28.7%) subsequently 
recorded; 75 (7.5%) offenders detected; 37 (3.7%) receive criminal charges; 21 
(2.1%) proceed to the court; 15 (1.5%) found guilty; and only 4 (0.4%) would receive 
a custodial sentence. They continue that even if a further 10% were prosecuted, this 
would merely raise the incarceration rate by 0.4%, making little difference in 
outcome whilst consuming significantly more resources. Reflecting on this argument, 
Ratcliffe (2008) argues a more effective strategy would be to use an intelligence-led 
approach to prevent the crimes at source.  
 
Although the debate between prevention and enforcement has previously 
concentrated upon ‘volume crime’ (for example shoplifting, vehicle crime, minor 
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assault and burglary) interest has more recently turned to whether these principles 
can be used as a more effective and inexpensive approach to organised crime (Kirby 
& Penna, 2010; Bullock et al. 2010). Tilley (2005:266), argues that ‘crime is the 
intended consequence of unintentional opportunity’ therefore from this perspective 
it follows that by reducing the opportunity, crime can be prevented. This is the 
essence of a Situational Crime Prevention approach (SCP), which focuses on the 
‘here and now’ rather than wider or more abstract biological, psychological or 
sociological explanations surrounding the causes of crime (Clarke, 1995). Specifically 
‘Routine Activity Theory’, an influential theory in this approach argues there are 
three conditions that must come together, in time and space, for a crime to occur: a 
motivated offender, a suitable target, and the lack of a capable guardian (Cohen & 
Felson, 1979, Felson, 2002, Clarke and Felson, 2008). As such by directing the 
intervention to reduce the motivation of the offender or vulnerability of the 
potential victim, the likelihood of criminal activity can be reduced (Laycock, 2005).  
 
As Clarke (1997) suggests SCP is different to enforcement led approaches as it, 
“seeks not to sanction but to [...] forestall the occurrence of crime” (Clarke, 1997:2). 
A further prominent theory within this stable is ‘Rational Choice Theory’ which 
assumes the offender adopts a rational perspective when engaging in offending 
behaviour; albeit this decision-making may be distorted through alcohol or other 
cognitive malfunction (Laycock, 2005). Extending this argument Cornish & Clarke 
(1986), propose offenders can be diverted from crime if the cost of committing it is 
greater than the benefit to be gained. Specifically they highlight five operational 
approaches that reduce the motivation of the offender, thereby achieving this 
objective in practice: a) increase the effort needed by the offender to commit the 
offence; b) increase the risk of detection; c) reduce the reward gained from the 
crime; d) reduce the provocation that may surround the crime (this is a category 
often applied to disorder); and e) remove any excuse the offender may use to justify 
their actions. Although this approach was used primarily to reduce volume crime 
(which concentrates around static locations and victims), more recent research is 
emerging to show this principle can also hold true for organized crime. Kennedy 
(2009) revealed how U.S. gang members could be deterred from committing violent 
 5 
crime if the interventions were sufficiently tailored to make it meaningful for the 
individual involved. Similarly Kirby & Penna (2010:204) showed how OCGs, involved 
in people trafficking, could be disrupted when the opportunities evident in the 
criminal process could be blocked. In this way Kirby & Penna (2010), encourage a 
deeper understanding of the crime process, specifically: establishing where the 
profits are made; who the actors are (offenders, victims and facilitators); as well as 
identifying the areas where criminal opportunity presents itself (for example 
inadequate government regulation). However not all academics are optimistic as to 
the benefits of this approach. Von Lampe (2011) argues the concept is useful, 
although at times has to be modified to such a level that its universal application can 
be questioned. Levi and Maguire (2004), feel there is insufficient research 
surrounding situational crime prevention and its implementation in relation to 
organised crime. There is also concern that removing the opportunity will merely 
cause displacement. Kleemans, et al. (2010) illustrated this concept highlighting that 
when the main ingredient for ecstacy (PMK) was restricted in the Netherlands it 
caused Dutch OCGs to work with Chinese OCGs to obtain an alternate supply. This 
rendered the restrictions useless, and added the offence of smuggling to the 
organized crime repertoire.  
 
However the profile of prevention and disruption as a viable strategy has increased. 
During July 2011 the UK Government published their latest organized crime strategy, 
‘From the local to the global’ (Home Office, 2011). As the title suggests it attempts to 
attack organized crime at all levels, looking for a more innovative approach whereby 
the wider policing community has a role in reducing organized crime. Its approach 
was based upon three principles: stem the opportunities for organized crime to take 
root; strengthen the use of enforcement against organized crime (using the full 
range of lawful interventions); and safeguarding communities, business and the 
state by examining and reducing vulnerability. However although prevention and 
disruption are terms used extensively by law enforcement agencies, there is limited 
empirical evidence of this approach being used and such approaches are notoriously 
difficult to implement. Whilst Sir Robert Peel may have been the first to highlight the 
importance of a preventative approach when forming the Metropolitan police in 
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1829, other police leaders have tried and failed in their attempts to mainstream the 
philosophy. The main difficulty appears to emanate from an organizational culture 
that values arrest and enforcement approaches more than prevention (Murray, 
2005; Read & Tilley 2000).  
 
The goal of this study is to increase understanding of how prevention and disruption 
can be used operationally to tackle organized crime by exploring the actions of a 
Police Force situated in the North of England over a period of three years. 
Specifically it will establish how an OCG is targeted for action, explore the 
interventions made, and assess the impact of these interventions by monitoring the 
quantitative impact as well as listening to the opinion of representatives from the 
police, other public agencies, and the community. However prior to presenting this 
case study there is a need to distinguish between the concepts of ‘prevention’ and 
‘disruption’. Kirby & Penna (2010:205) detail these differences in a previous paper, 
however in essence ‘prevention’ is taken to refer to those interventions that 
successfully stop or dismantle a single organized crime event, specifically those that 
“change a process or environment in a sustainable manner”. In contrast ‘disruption’ 
is, “a more flexible, transitory, and dynamic tactic, which can be used more generally 
to make the environment hostile for the organized crime group …… this approach 
focuses on disrupting the offender’s networks, lifestyle and routines”. Having 





The researchers, who were security vetted prior to the study, initially made contact 
with the police force during 2008 and followed the project for approximately three 
years. Gilmour (2008) in a previous paper explained how, during this period, police 
forces across England and Wales were engaged in a national project to 
systematically identify and analyze all OCG’s within their jurisdiction. Once identified 
each Police Force used a set criteria to assess the actual and potential threat they 
generated. This assessment criteria included: a) the level of injury to victims or 
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others caused by the OCG; b) the level of harm to the community; c) the level of 
impact to police/ government reputation; d) the criminal capability or capacity of the 
OCG; e) the geographic extent or ability of the OCG to cross borders (local, regional, 
national, or transnational); and f) the economic impact the OCG has on society. This 
assessment was based on criminal intelligence from a wide variety of sources and 
although the researchers were asked not to disclose specific details Ratcliffe (2002) 
has previously outlined the framework of an ‘intelligence led’ approach, which 
includes open sources, surveillance, informants, and financial investigation.  
 
As such by April 2009 the Police Force used in this study had mapped and ranked all 
the known OCGs in their jurisdiction and were faced with a dilemma. There were 
insufficient resources to tackle all OCGs in their area and by engaging with a 
resource intensive prosecution against the leaders of the most prominent OCG could 
result in associates filling the vacuum, leaving no resources to tackle the remainder. 
The leadership of this particular police force decided to attempt a more cost 
effective solution, using a multi-agency approach to deliver preventative and 
disruptive responses within the framework of SCP. Using project management the 
Constabulary applied a bronze, silver, gold methodology (Alison & Crego, 2005), 
placing individual management accountability at strategic, tactical and operational 
levels. The Police set the aims of the project as: reducing the financial profitability of 
the OCG; dismantling the OCG structure (and deterring others from taking its place); 
improving the safety of the area; and increasing public confidence in the police. In 
essence the strategic thrust of the police approach was to combine with other 
agencies to engender a zero tolerance approach regarding any inappropriate 
behavior exhibited by members of the OCG. The aim was to generate a hostile 
environment, reducing the opportunities for the OCG to commit crime. 
 
This study uses both quantitative and qualitative data in an attempt to obtain the 
widest possible assessment of the operation. Quantitative data, from closed source 
national and local police systems, was used to develop a profile for each OCG 
member, which included offending history both prior, and two years after the 
operation had commenced (obtained April 2009 and April 2011). Qualitative data 
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was obtained by interviewing individuals involved in the operation, specifically seven 
police officers, three members of external public sector organisations, and five 
members of the local community, with all respondents being in the age range of 30 
years to 75 years. The researchers were able to randomly choose police officers from 
those working on the project. As such the sample was balanced in relation to rank, 
role and gender with respondents including a Chief Officer, local Police Inspector, 
detectives and patrol officers. This was a significant and representative proportion of 
officers involved in the operation and provided an overview in relation to strategic, 
tactical and operational issues (Alison & Crego, 2005). The respondents from the 
three public sector partner agencies in essence selected themselves, as they were 
the lead representatives from the external agencies most frequently used on this 
project. As such they were selected due to their level of participation. This left the 
selection of the community representatives and the assistance of the Neighborhood 
Inspector was required in relation to introductions. Unsurprisingly the researchers 
were introduced to the most active members of the small community who lived in 
the same area as the OCG. Although these were a small group there was some scope 
to balance the participants in terms of gender and socio-economic background. As 
the participants constituted a diverse group overall, semi-structured interviews were 
used to provide flexibility when exploring the complex and sensitive issues 
surrounding this subject (Barriball and White, 1994). The interviews took place in 
police and private premises (based on the preference of the respondent), and 
adhered to the following framework:  
 
Operational police officers were interviewed regarding:  
• The impact of the OCG on the community. 
• The effectiveness of the policing interventions. 
• The effectiveness of the preventative strategy. 
• How the success of the police operation was guaged. 
 
Representatives from the external organizations were interviewed regarding:  
• Their knowledge of the OCG. 
 9 
• Their actions in reducing the criminality of the OCG, either alongside the 
police or as an individual organisation.  
• Their evaluation of the police, and the effectiveness of the strategy and 
interventions against the OCG.  
• Evaluation of the communication between the police and other 
organisations. 
 
Members of the community were interviewed regarding:  
• Their knowledge of the OCG in their neighbourhood. 
• Their perceptions as to the effectiveness of the police in dealing with the 
OCG.  
• Their future expectations. 
A content analysis was then conducted across the range of responses, to highlight 




The findings will be divided into three sections. The first section will explore the 
characteristics of the OCG and describe how offending patterns changed during the 
police operation. The second section will describe the interventions made by the 
police/ partner agencies, categorizing them within the preventative framework 
expounded in Cornish & Clarke’s (1986) account of ‘rational choice theory’ (reduce 
the rewards, remove the excuses, and increase effort and risk). Finally the section 
will provide the results from the semi-structured interviews, outlining the views of 
the police, public agency, and community representatives. 
 
A profile of the Organised Crime Group members 
The OCG initially highlighted by the Police involved 30 individuals, who appeared to 
be working together on a variety of criminal endeavors. However further analysis of 
police intelligence systems classified 13 as core members with the remaining 17 
comprising a wider network, who were used when needed. Although there were no 
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organized crime prosecutions against this group intelligence showed their significant 
involvement in this area, ranging from violent extortion to large scale fraud. From 
this intelligence-led approach there appeared considerable information supporting 
the assertion that the group members were involved in organized crime, consistent 
with the UK and international descriptions outlined earlier. The majority of the 
individuals were resident in a small rural village on the outskirts of an English city, 
policed on a daily basis by the local Police Community Support Officer (PCSO) who 
was also responsible for nearby villages. The nearest police station was 
approximately a 15 minute car drive away.   
 
All but two of the 13 core members were male and all were aged between 23-56 
years. There was a strong family connection as 85% were related to each other, 
whilst the remaining 15% were close associates, having known each other from a 
young age. Intelligence systems showed that no member of the core group had any 
legal visible income, nor did they pay taxes, although many claimed some level of 
social security benefit. There were visible assets associated with members of the 
OCG who, amongst other things, had built large detached houses in the area. The 13 
members of the group had a total number of 90 previous convictions, prior to the 
police operation commencing. Table 1 below shows the average age and range of 
criminal convictions.  
 
 
   TABLE I HERE 
 
 
Prior to the operation starting a content analysis showed criminal convictions 
generally fell within three legislative categories. The most common contravened the 
Theft Act (theft, handling stolen goods; aggravated vehicle taking; theft of/from a 
vehicle; burglary; and going equipped with tools for the intention of stealing). The 
second highest conviction type related to the Road Traffic Act (driving without a 
license; driving whilst uninsured; and dangerous driving). Finally a smaller number of 
the prior convictions contravened the Public Order Act (using threatening, abusive, 
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insulting words or behavior against others). However during the research it was 
highlighted by a number of police officers that the most influential OCG members 
were “reluctant to get their hands dirty”. As such a more detailed assessment was 
conducted of the number and types of convictions for each of the core members. 
This showed that whereas one offender had no criminal convictions (or impending 
prosecutions) three offenders accounted for approximately ⅔ of the total 
convictions and one offender accounted for 39% of convictions. As has been 
mentioned there was a notable absence of prosecutions involving organized crime. 
 
The analysis revisited offending history two years after the operation had started 
and found a further 6 convictions and 21 pending prosecutions (range 0-4, mean 
1.62). These offences were different in profile to the earlier ones. The most frequent 
offences were in contravention of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (S.43) and 
the Fraud Act 2006 (S.35). These included the depositing of controlled waste without 
a license and organized insurance fraud involving vehicle collisions. Perhaps the most 
critical appraisal was conducted by the Constabulary who re-assessed the OCG two 
years after the operation had commenced, using the same threat matrix mentioned 
in the introduction. Using available intelligence across the six criteria the police 
representative revealed the OCG had diminished in terms of capacity, capability and 
impact with a number of the offenders in prison, and some apparently desisting 
from criminal activity. This meant the threat score had reduced significantly and the 
OCG were no longer ranked as the most threatening alliance in their jurisdiction.  
 
The interventions  
The previous section has shown that the police operation made a difference in terms 
of the outcome. This section will look at the strategy and interventions in more 
detail. Goldstein (1979) has previously argued preventative problem solving 
approaches differ to traditional methods, as they generally require a partnership 
approach. This was certainly true of the interventions observed in this project as 
they were all based on a team approach, which mobilized other agencies (both 
commercial and public) to share information, pool resources, and deliver the most 
effective response. The most common partner was local government, which included 
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the: building planning department; anti-social behaviour officers; ‘rights of way’ 
department; and environmental services. Other partners included the: Driver and 
Vehicle Licensing Agency; The Crown Prosecution Service; The Fire and Rescue 
service; Land Registry; The Environment Agency; Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs; Department of Works and Pensions; Vehicle and Operator Services Agency; 
as well as members of the community. The use of such partners was varied and one 
good example relates to the joint working between the Constabulary and the 
Environment agency. In this instance members of the OCG were suspected of 
illegally dumping waste substances and, although a serious offence, the Environment 
Agency had insufficient capability to conduct an effective investigation. However by 
allowing the Environment Agency to use the police surveillance team, evidence to 
prove this offence was established within a day (the police surveillance team 
commenting that following a cumbersome lorry was the easiest task they had ever 
undertaken).  
 
The next stage was to explore whether the interventions could fit conceptually 
within the framework postulated by Cornish & Clarke’s (1986). To do this the 
researchers harvested all individual interventions conducted on OCG members 
between April 2009 and April 2011 and established whether their aim was to:  
• Increase the effort needed to commit the crime,  
• Increase the risk of being caught,  
• Reduce the rewards from the crime,  
• Remove the excuses to justify the crime. 
 
 




Many of the police and partner tactics were repeated throughout the two-year 
period, however table 2 shows the main interventions. It should be noted that a  
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further category ‘reduce the provocation to commit the crime’ is suggested by 
Cornish & Clarke (1986). However this category more frequently relates to offences 
of disorder, and as the content analysis found no such interventions it was deleted 
from the table. The results show the interventions fit comfortably within this 
conceptual framework, although appearing to concentrate within the ‘increasing the 
risk of detection’ category. 
 
 
The view of police, partner and community representatives 
The final analysis in this section examines the opinions of those involved with the 
operation, specifically seven serving police officers (Group 1), three members of 
external organisations (Group 2), and five members of the community (Group 3). The 
areas discussed with the respondents have been highlighted in the methodology 
section. Before exploring the opinions of each individual group it should be 
highlighted that there was unanimous agreement the OCG had impacted negatively 
on the local community creating fear and intimidation. In essence it appeared the 
small village had been disproportionately affected by the OCG, effectively destroying 
a previously close-knit community.  
 
Turning to the police officers they were in agreement that, prior to this operation, 
policing was ineffective in the area and made little impact against the OCG. Although 
they felt this operation had been effective, six of the seven officers felt it could have 
been improved. The reasons for this generally revolved around the scope for better 
partnership working, and the availability of more resources. The officers 
unanimously supported the zero tolerance approach to any illegal behaviour 
exhibited by members of the group, and felt this became increasingly effective as it 
continued. One officer said, “when we took action for a motoring offence or turned 
up at an address word quickly went around and we would be joined by other 
members of the group who tried to intimidate us. As the operation continued 
members of the group became more compliant as they realized we would not be put 
off by their actions” (participant 5). It was clear the interviewed police officers felt 
they had made a difference in reducing both the OCG criminal activity and general 
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bad behaviour. One of the officers said, “We always speak to them when we see 
them out and about. They know they can’t get away with anything” (participant 2). 
 
Moving on to the three external partner agency representatives, similar points were 
highlighted. All three saw a significant change in the attitude and actions of the 
police. Although they initially felt there was a lack of understanding they stated 
communication improved significantly as the operation continued, leading to better 
information sharing and understanding between the different agencies. One 
participant supported the commonly heard theme that police interventions became 
progressively more successful as time progressed. It was felt this was because 
understanding had grown concerning the range of offending by the OCG and the 
diversity of sanctions that could be used by different agencies. Similarly the 
increased number of partner agencies and members of the community meant the 
flow of information increased significantly. In fact one of the partners stated, “When 
we shared information we saw we were often looking at the same people. Those 
who were causing the police a problem were also causing us a problem”. Similarly it 
became clear that the OCG were intimidating and it appeared partners felt more 
confident taking action for such issues as planning irregularities, knowing the police 
would support them.  
 
Perhaps the most illuminating information came from the final interviews conducted 
with five members of the community, who had been village residents between 8-75 
years. It was evident that the community noticed a significant amount of unreported 
activity and heard numerous rumours. They were very clear that the OCG was 
involved in criminality due to the visible level of assets with no visible means of 
providing them. Further the residents often observed overt antisocial behaviour by 
OCG members, such as speeding, ‘wheelying’ motorcycles, burning wire to extract 
copper, and illegal tipping.  
 
Summarizing the respondents’ views it appeared the new level of transparency, 
engagement, and increased activity from the police had galvanized community spirit, 
leading to a self disclosed rise in public confidence. The majority of participants 
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argued that previously, the police were ineffective at reducing crime and disorder 
because of their reluctance to act; poor communication, lack of community 
consultation; and their reliance on crime statistics prior to taking action (when most 
of the OCG crimes went unreported). The community representatives felt this new 
approach had completely reversed the overall management of the area. The 
majority of participants also perceived the police operation had been a success in 
terms of reducing the criminality of the OCG and the fear among the community. 
Indeed as police actions increased members of the community also started taking a 
more prominent role, even engaging in civil law to reduce the noise caused by some 
of the OCG members. A community representative also stated an unintended 
benefit was the improved behaviour of younger people from the village, as they saw 






Although this study has generated many discussion points, three particular areas will 
be concentrated upon: the characteristics of the organized crime group; the 
effectiveness of the strategy and interventions; and community perceptions. 
 
As discussed the OCG in this study exhibit many of the central characteristics 
highlighted by academic commentators (de Heijden, 2008), and the UK definition 
used for this study. It was interesting to note throughout the group were epitomized 
by their use of intimidation against those they came in conflict with, including local 
government officials. However OCG’s are not a homogenous group and will operate 
at different levels, therefore although these individuals were mobile and moved 
across regional borders, they remained based in the UK and did not appear to 
engage in transnational crime. Further, the OCG appeared to follow a hybrid model, 
using both a traditional family structure (Hobbs, 1998), as well as engaging in a fluid 
network of other known criminals (Galeotti, 2005). A further distinctive 
characteristic of this group was that it enjoyed a clear hierarchy. In this way there 
was a clear leader with different individuals performing different roles; something 
 16 
particularly noticeable in individuals used predominantly as ‘enforcers’, who 
collected the most criminal convictions. A further finding was the group appeared to 
constantly diversify into different types of crime, appearing to seize available 
opportunity in terms of making money illegally. It therefore appeared that the OCG 
presented itself as a close-knit group of individuals defined only by their motivation 
to make significant amounts of money through illegal means. Whether they did this 
through extortion, organized fraud or illegal tipping appeared immaterial. 
 
At this stage it is also useful to comment upon the impact of the operation in terms 
of the OCG offending behaviour. The 13 core members of the group had 90 criminal 
convictions, which extended over a 30 year period, prior to the operation 
commencing. In the two years following commencement of the operation a further 6 
convictions were recorded together with 21 pending prosecutions. Knowing how to 
interpret these statistics is problematic. It is clear offending behaviour had not 
stopped, however it also appeared probable that as much organized crime is hidden 
(Maguire, 2007), this increased police scrutiny merely highlighted what was already 
there. There was a further major change; prior to the operation commencing the 
OCG members were typically convicted of overt crimes involving identifiable victims 
such as theft, burglary, assault, and public disorder. However the crimes pending 
prosecution two years later, such as extensive illegal tipping and large-scale 
insurance fraud, were considerably more covert and could be labeled as organized 
crime. Again interpretation is difficult; advocates of crime displacement theory argue 
that reducing the opportunity for crime will merely encourage offenders to alter 
their criminality by geography, time, target or crime type (Weisburd, et al., 2006). 
Conversely it could also be argued that the OCG have always engaged in this type of 
offence but have gone undetected. The view of the interviewed police officers, 
supported by the local community, was the true scale of criminality only became 
apparent after the operation commenced, and evidence was uncovered to support 
the prosecution of ‘organized crime’. Prior to that members of the OCG had only 
been prosecuted for peripheral offences, when their behavior was visible. 
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Turning to the effectiveness of the strategy, whilst the Police were faced with the 
rigours of the operation the researchers had the time to be more reflective, looking 
for the meaning, understanding and the impact of the operational tactics. The use of 
the Cornish & Clarke (1986) model to consider how offenders can be deterred from 
organized crime served as a useful tool for this analysis and can also provide a more 
creative framework for the police when considering interventions in the future. 
However in relation to the police operation the strategy of using a multi agency 
approach to create a hostile environment for the OCG was a significant change from 
the usual operating procedure. The enormity of this change is only apparent when it 
is realized that the normal enforcement approach to organized crime relies on a 
team of specialist detectives who work covertly in an effort to gather sufficient 
evidence to deliver a successful prosecution against the offenders. This approach 
normally relies on secrecy and painstaking observations, concentrating on a 
particular crime. However this traditional approach was completely inverted in this 
project as, rather than keeping the operation secret, it was publicized to the 
community, partner agencies, and even the OCG themselves. This is because the 
objective had changed – no longer was prosecution the main aim but the reduction 
of organized crime. This allowed the informing of others and a pooling of 
information; fundamental elements in making sure a much wider audience owned 
the OCG problem.  
 
What this also meant was that the policing strategy sought to impact on the 
individual offender rather than a specific crime event, product or market. In essence 
the focus was widened to enforce any type of offence committed within the 
offenders lifestyle. This meant in practice that officers did not try and prevent a 
specific crime being committed (for example the organized theft of metal from 
railway lines) but sought to deter the organized criminal committing any offence by 
prosecuting them for any misdemeanor. This strategy would fall into what Kirby & 
Penna (2011) refer to as disruption, rather than prevention, with the majority of 
interventions falling under ‘increasing the risk of detection’. It joined up other 
agencies in this endeavor with policing seen as a wider concept and not just seen as 
the responsibility of the police institution. Secondly it increases the opportunity to 
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prosecute the offenders involved for a wide variety of behaviors and in doing so 
disrupt the offenders network and lifestyle. Third, unlike a conventional 
enforcement approach there was no clear start and end date. The police approach 
was to constantly exploit disruption opportunities rather than focus on one 
particular prosecution for one particular crime.  
 
Although a layperson may assume OCG members would improve their behavior 
whilst targeted by the police this phenomenon did not occur. Similarly it appeared 
individuals could not separate their offending behaviour from their everyday lives. 
Academics involved in offender behaviour based research argue an individuals’ 
personality is often associated with their offending. So, for example, an inherently 
violent individual would use the threat of force to subdue a victim, rather than 
attempt to deceive them (Canter & Kirby 1995; Canter & Youngs, 2009). Similarly 
Dean et al. (2010) argue that although criminal entrepreneurship is driven by profit, 
achieving profitable illegitimacy can materialize in many forms including the 
exhibition of socio-pathology. Using these concepts the study found that personal 
characteristics of the OCG members could emerge in pre-cursor or post event 
offences, as well as peripheral behaviour emanating from their daily lives. In this way 
showing disrespect for the law (ignoring planning permission, driving offences), or 
disrespect for other citizens (making threats, generating noise nuisance), were often 
observed. This is important as it makes the OCG members visible and vulnerable to 
intervention on a wide variety of matters, thereby making the disruption strategy 
viable. 
 
In terms of the effectiveness of the approach all individuals interviewed during the 
operation felt that the criminality emanating from the OCG had reduced. This was 
even though statistically the impending prosecutions showed this was not the case. 
Exploring this conflict it appeared that all those involved felt much more 
knowledgeable about the previously hidden offending rate of the group. As such 
they genuinely believed the OCG posed less of a threat and this was supported when 
the group was assessed using the national threat matrix mentioned in the 
introduction. These objective criteria, based on verifiable intelligence, showed that 
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the offending behavior had significantly reduced. It was felt this trend accelerated as 
the operation continued.  
 
Similarly the zero tolerance approach also appeared popular with participants and 
observers alike. It appeared from the interviews one of the unintended 
consequences of an intelligence led approach has been to distance some police 
officers from the community, relying on back-office processes of intelligence 
collection and analysis to target offenders in a covert fashion. The prevention/ 
disruption process has inverted this previous approach. The adoption of a multi 
agency approach has been achieved through a variety of strategies including, a) 
enhancing the awareness of other agencies roles and powers; b) holding specific 
meetings for police, partner agencies, and the community; c) increasing community 
contact and consultation to improve confidence. In essence this was a very public 
and transparent approach in which the balance of power transferred from the OCG 
to the community.  
 
Similarly this approach can improve satisfaction and confidence in the police. An 
intelligence led approach relies heavily on recorded crime statistics to target 
intelligence led approaches (Ratcliffe, 2008). However as Maltz (1979) argued the 
overall nature of organised crime makes it highly problematic for the police and 
other law enforcement agencies due to its covert nature. The OCG was concentrated 
in a small geographic area and this increased their solidarity and reputation. As the 
years progressed they had become emboldened, manipulating civil laws such as 
planning permission, and minor road traffic laws such as speeding. When challenged 
by residents, local government representatives or police officers they would respond 
aggressively resulting in them living relatively unchecked. This study showed 
community members felt intimidated and fearful of the OCG, which prevented them 
from reporting criminal activity. Crime statistics showed that there was no crime 
problem in the area and, therefore, policing was minimal. Participants stated, “crime 
was not tackled at an earlier stage because there was a significant lack of awareness 
and visible policing” (Participant 12). Once the agencies came together they all 
articulated similar problems concerning OCG members, being able to share their 
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suspicions and ultimately generating a much fuller picture regarding their criminality. 
A further benefit from this approach appeared to be much stronger police-
community relationship, with more active citizenship. Community representatives 
were honest in their appreciation of being intimidated, making comments such as 
“they think we won’t react and will just let them continue” (participant 15). However 
when the operation commenced it led to some of the community playing a more 
active role, reporting crimes and being prepared to progress private prosecutions. 
Members of the community expressed that they “didn’t necessarily want to take 
them [the OCG] to court [...] it is costing me a lot too [...] we simply want them to 
apologise and stop causing the problem” (participant 15).  
 
It appears that a disruption strategy, as outlined in this study, has much to commend 
it in relation to addressing ‘lifestyle criminals’, an aim highlighted by the UK Serious 
Organized Crime Agency (SOCA, 2011). It was highlighted by the police that a large, 
highly trained covert investigative team was not always needed to generate 
significant results against organized crime. In this project a team approach, utilizing 
uniform and detective staff, allowing flexible and diverse interventions under a 
general framework of disruption, can serve as a strong deterrent on the motivation 
of offenders. Further whilst aligned to a preventative framework these disruption 
tactics are more allied to enforcement than prevention, making it culturally 
acceptable to the police. The approach is action oriented and confrontational, 
making it popular with community residents who see a tangible police /partner 
response. This appeared to embolden the neighborhood who started to challenge 
inappropriate behavior themselves, increasing community efficacy (Sampson et al. 
1997). This approach was also well received by partner agencies who also appeared 
to enjoy the team approach and the benefits it brought. However a critical question 
is whether this approach is transferable to other police jurisdictions and whether it is 
sustainable? A pertinent point was made by a member of the community who 
stated, “complete success within policing operations is driven by the enthusiasm, 
dedication and leadership of the police as a team” (participant 15). Further, although 
the police stated this approach consumed fewer resources than a conventional 
prosecution, disruption tactics do rely on police officers and equipment being 
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available over time. In this study it must be acknowledged that the operation was 
sustained with commitment and persistence over a significant period of time, 
elements which appeared key to its success. Therefore questions will always arise as 





With the increased capacity and capability of organized crime groups to create 
significant harm at a transnational, national, and local level, enforcement is 
becoming an expensive and often ineffective tool. This study has examined a policing 
operation, which has identified and intervened against OCG using a more innovative 
approach. The interventions, more aligned to disruption that prevention, appeared 
effective in reducing the capacity and capability of the OCG as well as increasing the 
number of prosecutions. The approach appeared popular with the police, possibly 
because the tactics were more aligned with enforcement, which are culturally more 
acceptable than prevention. Similarly the approach was popular with the partner 
agencies as well as the public, the latter seeing a tangible difference in their 
community. The use of the Cornish & Clarke (1986) ‘Rational Choice’ model provides 
a creative framework to generate and analyse future interventions as well as provide 
a structure to disrupt lifestyle criminals involved in organized crime. However 
although in theory this policing style can be transferred to any police jurisdiction 
(indeed across jurisdictions), it does rely on effective police leadership to: enthuse 
operational staff to use this approach; ensure tactics are lawful and proportional; 
and generate strong external partnerships. However as many commentators have 
observed research in this area is severely limited (von Lampe, 2011) and more is 
required to ultimately test the efficacy of this approach in different locations and on 
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Table I (below) showing the age and offending history for the OCG, prior to the police operation 
commencing. 
 
Variable Range Mean  S.D. 
Age (years) 23 – 56 39.08  10.81 
Number of offences (per person) 0 – 35  6.92  9.11 
Number of convictions (per person)  0 – 15  4.31  4.05 
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 Table II showing the interventions used against OCG members, categorized in accordance 










Increase effort Increase risk Reduce rewards Remove Excuses 
1. Traffic calming 
measures to reduce 
speeding along the main 
street. 
 
1. Use of Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition (ANPR) on 
all OCG vehicles. Providing 
information as to movement 
of OCG related vehicles.  
 
1. Use of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 to seize and 
confiscate money obtained 
from crime by OCG 
members 
1. Traffic calming 
measures and notices 
2. Increased police 
visibility in area of OCG 
residences to challenge 
low level criminal 
behaviour 
2. Monitor OCG’s TV licence, 
mortgages, bank accounts, 
mobile phones, travel 
documents etc. to identify 
any wider offending. 
2. Preventing the 
development of houses and 
removal of unlawful 
buildings through the 
enforcement of planning 
regulations (no response 
results in demolition).  
2. Notices issued by 
County Council to all 
residents of the village 
relating to anti social 
behaviour (noise 
nuisance). These establish 
what is and what is not 
appropriate. 
 3. Implementation of CCTV 
throughout the village 
 





 4. Zero tolerance of traffic 
violations by OCG members. 
 




 5. Increasing resources and 
focus in relation to 
gathering of intelligence 
regarding OCG members, to 
establish the parameters of 
offending. 
 
6. Using plain clothed 
officers to patrol the area. 
 
7. Supply photos and 
information regarding OCG 
members to partner 
agencies, to assist 
identification of OCG in 
wider offences 
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